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'KEEP YOUR FINGERS OUT!'
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON FINANCIAL ABUSE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.
A. P. Cheater*
'Ndiri il lite ra te . Handizivi kuba nepenzura.' (I am illite ra te . I do not 
know how to steal using a pencil.)
Introduction
The t it le  of th is paper is  a piece of verbatim advice given by the chairman of 
a selection committee to a successful job applicant. The opening quotation 
comes from a member of a co-operative executive committee, an immediate 
reaction to a fieldworker's preliminary enquiries regarding missing money in 
the cooperative. Taken together, these quotable fie ld  notes illu stra te  one 
of the many paradoxes of third world development.
On the one hand, literacy is  an essential sk il l  in financial administration, 
and numeracy is  even more important. On the other hand, precisely because 
these s k i l l s  are in short supply and are not easily  controlled, especially in 
rural areas, they are regarded with suspicion, for it  is  the lite rate, numerate 
individual who may use precisely these s k i l l s  to defraud less educated fellows.
The problem of financial abuse, including both misappropriation(of funds and 
materials) and mismanagement, is  well-recognised in the third world, though it  
is  by no means limited to developing states. This acknowledged problem is  
explained sometimes in terms of the conflict between un iversa liStic  and 
particu la ristic  norms (Huntington, 1968; Peil, 1976); sometimes as a result 
of cultural expectations (Ottenberg, 1967). Leys (1965) has asked whether 
bribes to administrative o ff ic ia ls  might not function as a form of indirect 
taxation, perhaps averting critica l wage demands by low-paid c iv il servants.
More generally, Nye (1967) identifies the p o ss ib ilit ie s  of capital formation 
and economic incentives as some of the sp in-off benefits of financial corruption 
Such functional approaches to the question of financial abuse emphasise the 
beneficial rather than the problematic nature of this behaviour endemic in the 
third world.
The endemic nature of financial abuse contains within it  a second paradox 
important to development: that while financial abuse is  theoretically deplored,
at least in Zimbabwe, i t  is  nevertheless expected. A degree of gentle ridicule 
i f  not overt scorn, is  the like ly  lot of anyone who comes out of po lit ic s, 
local or national, poorer than he went in. Such a person is at best naive, 
at worst a fool, for scrupulous honesty may not be what i t  seens on the 
surface, but rather a thin cover for ineptitude, in not making hay while the 
sun shines. Thus the public o ffic ia l cannot win: i f  he puts his fingers in
a public t i l l ,  he does what everyone expected him to; i f  he does not, he must 
be stupid.
How, then, are we to understand - as a prerequisite to controlling - financial 
abuse?
Given that financial abuse, in specific instances, is  defined and assessed 
situationally, in general I think that the answer to th is question lie s  in a 
socio-politica l analysis of it s  causes. My view is  derived from fieldwork
*  Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia.
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experience in the early nineteen seventies among black commercial farmers in 
central Zimbabwe. One might object that what goes on in local communities 
bears l i t t le  relevance to the national scale, much less to grand theory, but my 
view is  that, because m icropolitical processes are sim ilar at local and national 
levels, generalisation is  not only possible, but potentially very useful.
At the. local level, I found two factors to be c rit ica l to any understanding of 
financial abuse. On the one hand, as individuals, local po litic ians were 
concerned with their personal reputations; as co lle c t iv it ie s, in contrast, they 
were concerned to protect public funds, for which they were responsible, from 
predation. This latter concern, of course, fed back into personal reputation 
management: no-one wanted to be in office when public funds publicly went
missing! Yet the two factors, although practically interdependent, were 
conceptually d istinct from one another: the behaviour of local po litic ians in
the two major institutions in the area, the council and the co-operative, 
reflected th is d istinction and interdependence.
Reputation Management
Reputation is  a c r it ica l issue to a ll would-be po litic ians. That is  not to 
say that other factors, including bribery, do not influence voting patterns, 
but merely to note that, i f  a person's reputation is  clearly that of a man on 
the make, with supporting h istorical evidence, people w ill be wary of returning 
him to public office to make some more.
The question of reputation is  particularly important when ordinary, ill-educated 
people are elected to office to take responsib ility  for the actions of sub­
ordinate employees who have spec ia list qualifications. In th is respect at 
least, the position of the local councillor exactly paralle ls that of the 
parliamentarian. Thus, in the area I studied, councillors expected (with some 
h istorical ju stifica tion , one might add) that their administrative sta ff would, 
given half a chance, steal their funds, which were derived from rates and 
government grants. But councillors were equally aware that they themselves 
were like ly  to be arraigned on sim ilar charges by an ever-suspicious public. 
Maybe the ir electorate was not as v ig ilan t as they gave it  credit for: I
personally heard re lative ly  l i t t le  in the way of interpersonal gossip during the 
course of my fieldwork, and that mainly from councillors rather than ordinary 
people. Nevertheless, local po litic ians perceived themselves to be under 
constant public scrutiny: 'People think i t  is  us councillors who are careless
about money'; 'Th is has given a very poor impression to the pub lic '; 'People 
judge'; 'We're laying ourselves open to accusations of being bought'; 'We 
can 't hide things from the pub lic '; 'We must record that i t  has proved 
impossible to check this expenditure - to cover ourse lves'; 'Who is  going to 
explain to the p ub lic ? ';  'Let the people know' - or else 'Parents w ill describe 
the work of the Council as corruption and chaos'.
Given th is e xp lic it belief in unceasing public scrutiny, one assumes that 
individual councillors and co-operative committee members were acting upon a 
public stage most of the time. Indeed, the premise was that committee 
privacy would be breached by pub gossip. (Yet even th is premise referred to 
reputation, for it  was well-known that the majority of local po litic ians were 
not drinkers.) The assumption of open confidentiality underlay reputation 
management in th is area, for it  was by judicious ta ilo ring of verbal pa rtic i­
pation in committee work that members managed the contexts from which gossip 
would flow. It  was not possible, of course, to manage the content it se lf  of 
the gossip.
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As Paine (1967) has indicated, gossip is  one means of information management; 
concerning, among other things, questions of reputation and good names 
(Wilson, 1974). The subject of gossip has l i t t le  control over what is 
communicated as gossip content, therefore, i t  is only good sense to attempt to 
control, or manage, the context from which the content w ill flow. For the 
political figure, i t  is  important that there should be gossip. As Oscar 
Wilde remarked, there is  only one thing worse than being talked about, and that 
is  not being talked about. Thus i t  is ,  perhaps, more useful to be thought to 
have one's fingers in improper places, than for the public to be unaware that 
one has fingers at a ll.  I t  therefore makes sense to reiterate, loudly, 
publicly and ad nauseum, that ‘Public money is  not to be played with' - i f  only 
to counter-baTance rumours concerning where one spent the la st misappropriation. 
Both pieces of gossip w ill contribute to maintaining one's interest-rating among 
the public and to ensuring that one has a reputation. I f  one's committee 
colleagues are those who control information seepage to the general public, it  
also makes good sense to concern oneself primarily with influencing those 
colleagues ( i f  necessary by the judicious use of v is it in g  researchers).
Thus, in retrospect, I do not find it  surprising that so much of my information 
on financial abuse was gained in the course of semi-public committee meetings 
(see table 1 below), although at the time I thought i t  somewhat improper, not 
to say p o lit ic a lly  dangerous, for such matters to be aired in a re lative ly 
public context so frequently. I t  is  in the committee meeting, of course, that 
regular opportunities to influence one's colleagues arise. And i t  is  in this 
semi-public arena, too, that one may feel called upon, f ir s t ly ,  to defend one's 
actions, even i f  explanations are not e xp lic it ly  demanded, and secondly, to 
answer specific allegations of malpractice.
In the committee situation, i t  was possible to identify a number of different 
reaction strategies to counter im plicit or exp lic it allegations of financial 
abuse. Working on the assumption that the best form of defence is  attack, 
one strategy was to bring rumoured allegations out into the open, in public, 
oneself. As a shock tactic, th is may be very effective: I well remember my
own open-mouthed reaction when a councillor (then chairman of the Finance 
Committee) took the floor in a council meeting to announce that he was shocked 
to have heard rumours that he himself was misappropriating council funds. More 
hardened than myself, obviously, most councillors merely seemed s lig h t ly  
embarrassed, one suggesting that the matter did not fa ll under the agenda item 
being discussed at the time. A more common strategy, perhaps for the fa in t­
hearted, was to say nothing, for 'what can one say about such m isch ie f? '.
Vehement denial was used only rarely, perhaps on the assumption that no-one 
would believe it  anyway. Occasionally a third party would intervene to 
prevent an allegation 'v ic tim ' from saying anything. When this happened, it  
later became clear that the third person believed the 'v ictim ' to be gu ilty, 
but wished to save him the personal embarrassment of public exposure. My 
advice was sometimes so lic ited  on how best to ensure such protection.
It  goes without saying, of course, that candidates for election to public office 
wish to avoid such public exposure, for reasons of reputation. Re-election 
prospects diminish markedly once an open allegation of financial abuse has been 
made, even i f  the electoral process is  delayed. As late as 1975, local 
politic ians involved in scandals of financial abuse during my fieldwork (1973-4), 
were not returned to office. Reputation is by no means the only factor 
influencing the outcome of elections, of course, but in th is particular loca lity  
i t  was very important in the short- and medium-terms.
An indication of the importance of the issue of financial irregu larity  to local 
po litic ians in th is area is  contained in table 1. Over some eighteen months of
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fieldwork, 44 separate allegations of financial abuse became known to me: an
average of two and a half per month. These allegations converged on a limited 
number of people, as table 1 shows, and in some cases the same allegation, 
against the same person, was made by two or more people. The fact that 
reputation management starts in committee is  also reflected in the greater 
proportion of allegations made publicly or semi-publicly, as compared to 
those arising  in the course of private discussions.
Table 1. Exp lic it allegations of financial irregu larity  occurring during 
fieldwork
Number of Number 'V ictim s' (Semi-)public Private
separate alleging of allegations allegations
allegations abuse allegations
44 44 24 24 20
Misappropriation and Mismanagement
Financial abuse, as I have indicated earlier, includes both misappropriation 
and mismanagement. In a developing society, local or national, it  is 
important to differentiate theft from ineptitude in financial control, 
especially since those ostensibly qualified in financial management frequently 
have s k i l l s  that are but poorly developed. Local in stitu tion  treasurers 
sometimes have bookkeeping qualifications; government auditors of local 
councils and primary co-operatives are rarely qualified accountants. Thus when 
payment monies for goods purchased with public funds go m issing, frequently the 
underlying cause is poor financial management, i f  control systems exist at a ll. 
Table 2 shows that losses from mismanagement, in the area in which I worked, 
were nearly double those resulting from outright misappropriation.
Table 2. Council and co-operative losses from financial abuse.
Type & No. of Amount in R$ Loss borne by Employee
dates cases range total Institution  Individual dismissed
Mi smanaqement 
1966-
1974 12* 10-1300 3388+ 6 5  2
Misappropriation
1960-
1974 15 2- 600 1850+ 12 3 6
TOTALS 27 5250+ 18 8 8
*  One case purely budgetary estimation errors.
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Given that total budgets for these two in stitu tions over the periods involved 
were well over half a m illion dollars, perhaps closer to a m illion  dollars, 
one might well dismiss the amounts in table 2, in accountants' parlance, as 
'not m aterial'. Even in absolute terms, in a re lative ly prosperous farming 
area, they are not particularly large. So why a ll the fuss?
The answer to this question is  not simple. As a start, one might note that 
peasant societies are generally internally honest. But even though some 
fanners shared the peasant view that government (of whatever kind) is  fa ir  
gatne for exploitation, th is was not a peasant society. However, there was 
considerable divergence of views concerning public money and it s  o rig ins. For 
example, during the fieldwork period a co-operative society o ff ic ia l was 
accused, in a special general meeting, of misappropriating some R$300 from a 
fund for buying grains in small quantities, and it  was suggested that he repay 
the amount missing. In the course of discussion, one farmer took the floor 
to oppose the suggestion of repayment, asking rhetorically 'Who here has 
missed his or her money?' Directly, of course, no-one had: the cash had come
from the co-operative union. But the union derived it s  running costs from the 
handling charges deducted from members' marketed produce. Provided local 
people are not directly defrauded, then, any furore over missing money (or 
goods) cannot be explained d irectly in terms of morality issues. Morality is  
s ituationa l.
Nor have the past penalties for theft of public money been a major reason for 
the disapproval of such action. From table 2, it  is quite clear that f if t y  
per cent of those persons abusing public money, through incompetence or malice, 
suffered no penalty at a ll - save perhaps a tongue-lashing in committee.
However, the figures in table 2 are s lig h t ly  misleading in one respect: they
cover such a long period that they conceal a recent and increasing tendency for 
local institutions to get tough on offenders. Five of the total of eight 
employees dismissed, for example, were fired between 1972 and 1974. During 
the same period, losses were borne by employees in four of the total of eight 
cases. The apparent anomaly reflected in table 2, of in stitu tions bearing 
losses from misappropriation disproportionately more frequently than from 
mismanagement, is  at least partly explained by institutional policy on this 
matter during the research period. Council employees misappropriating funds 
or materials were immediately dismissed and sued, and thus the value of 
misappropriations was rarely recovered. In cases of mismanagement, however, 
councillors sought to retain the services of offending employees until their 
mistakes had been rectified (by salary deductions), before f ir in g  them.
Increasing severity in punishing white-collar crime in th is developing society 
is also reflected in the tightening of financial controls, through employment 
contracts specifying personal l ia b i l i t y  for losses, the proliferation of 
receipt books, and c iv il lawsuits against dismissed staff. The reason for such 
measures relates back, of course, to the reputations of local po litic ian s, 
elected to responsib ility  for financial a ffa irs.
However, tightening financial control has, at least in the short term, simply 
exacerbated the problem. Dismissal of and lawsuit against administrative 
sta ff has led to increased sta ff turnover, which in turn has meant that the 
controls do not work in practice as they should in theory. Council secretaries 
and treasurers now know that they run an increased risk  of dismissal for 
financial irregu la ritie s, irrespective of whether they or the ir po litica l
1 7 7
controllers are primarily responsible for losses. So the ethos has become: 
get what you can while you can and then get out. In turn, such breakdown of 
controls increases the probability of po litica l controllers being suspected 
of misappropriation. But more importantly, they are seen to be less capable 
of controlling the institutions they were elected to manage on behalf of others. 
In both ways, their all-important reputations suffer. And when re-election 
prospects are seen to be diminishing, local po litic ians may also adopt the 
ethos of their employees: get what you can while you can and then get out!
The ultimate end to such a downward spiral is  jud ic ial financial management, or 
even bankruptcy of the institution  - a final collapse of reputation, collectively 
as well as ind ividually, for those at the helm when the ship goes down. During 
my fie ld  work, the local council was threatened with judicial financial 
management by the d is t r ic t  commissioner's office, and the subsequent hard work 
by (certain) councillors to avoid this disgrace showed quite clearly that such 
a collapse of reputation was regarded as being p o lit ic a lly  fatal. The later 
electoral shake-up in 1975, could also be taken as an indication that the 
public, in th is case, was equally concerned about it s  collective reputation as 
represented in it s  major in stitu tions, for those po litic ians who had contributed 
to the threat of financial disgrace were replaced by 'clean ' newcomers.
Solutions?
There is  no single  measure to prevent the growth of financial abuse in 
developing societies, at any level. Indeed, even i f  a package of interrelated 
solutions were to be implemented, there is  no guarantee that it  would be 
effective, given the primary concern of po litic ians with their personal 
reputation. (Such concern may entail, particularly at the local level, sh ifting 
the blame for p o lit ic ian s ' misappropriations (especially of materials) on to 
the shoulders of administrative sta ff, in the guise of financial mismanagement.) 
S t i l l  le ss can any single solution - such as the employment of graduate 
administrators and accountants - be expected to work.
With that caveat, however, certain changes could reasonably be expected to 
improve the situation in th is country. F irs t ly , better training and more 
experience are necessary to produce more competent administrative staff. Four 
years of secondary schooling, plus a one-year certificate  or three-year, 
in-service, part-time diploma are simply not adequate training for managers 
of business enterprises with six-figure  annual budgets.
Secondly, to attract better-qualified personnel to rural employment, either 
increased remuneration or coercion w ill be necessary. I f  increased 
remuneration is  chosen, the speed of rural development in general must be 
greatly increased, both to finance such administrative expenditure and, more 
importantly, to close the income gap between employees and employers. 
Currently, local institution  professional employees earn at the very least 
fifteen times the average per capita income of the rural people they serve.
Thus coercion, possibly in the form of compulsory, non-military national service, 
should seriously be considered as a p o ssib ility , since i t  could overcome the 
problem of income d ifferentia ls as well as that of recruitment to rural posts. 
People with the required s k i l l s  could be posted to specific areas at central 
government expense for the duration of their national service commitment.
National service pay, of course, would be reasonably close to peasant income
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levels. In addition, controls over national servicemen and women could be 
much more stringent than those currently existing with respect to ordinary 
employees.
Thirdly, more stringent financial controls are clearly necessary, including 
auditing by fu lly -qua lified  people. Some local controls have already been 
developed by the tr ia l and error process: where effective, these should be 
retained and developed further i f  necessary. However, much of the problem of 
financial abuse and it s  adverse effects on rural development could be 
eliminated by in stitu ting financial controls in advance of problems which 
could, and should, have been foreseen in pianning deve1opment..
In turn, financial controls can only work in the context of the financial 
education both of local po litica l controllers and of their constituents. Such 
financial education should include: basic literacy and numeracy geared to 
understanding simple financial statements; the free circulation of financial 
news (such as costs of development projects, income sources and amounts) 
possibly in the form of local newsletters; regular report-back meetings to 
constituents and consultation of the relevant electorate in a ll financial 
matters; and - for po litica l controllers - formal courses in institutiona l 
control, taught at an appropriate level. Unless such admittedly costly 
educational options are pursued, it  is highly improbable, in my own view, 
that the tightening of financial security w ill in it se lf  achieve it s  aim.
If ,  despite it s  current apparently low level, financial abuse continues to 
snowball, the process of development it se lf  w ill be jeopardised in our 
impoverished rural areas. When financial resources are limited, they must 
be used e ffic ien tly  to effect any general improvement in people's live s, 
rather than being siphoned o ff to enrich those few who have acquired sufficient 
s k i l l s  to impoverish the many whose development they carry in trust.
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